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2011: High Profile Corruption Charges Have
Generated Public Concern
STATE COURTS:
Baltimore City Mayor Sheila Dixon (for her actions when she was
President of the Baltimore City Council)
Baltimore City Councilwoman Helen L. Holton
Grand jury indictment of Del. Tiffany Alston

FEDERAL COURTS:
Prince George’s County Executive Jack Johnson and his wife (guilty
pleas)
State Senator Ulysses S. Currie (acquitted)
Anne Arundel County Councilman Daryl Jones, convicted of failure to
file federal personal income tax returns and business payroll tax
returns, refused to resign while he served his prison term
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S.B. 284 & 285 respond to the fact that the bribery
indictments of Sheila Dixon and Helen Holton were
dismissed on grounds of the “legislative privilege”
in MD Const., art. III, § 18.
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“No Senator or Delegate shall be liable, in
any civil action, or criminal prosecution,
whatever, for words spoken in debate.”
S.B. 284 amends the legislative privilege resulting
from this provision so as to create an explicit
exception for bribery, as defined in MD Const. art.
III,§ 50, which was added in 1867.

The 1776 Constitutional legislative privilege
was derived from the English Parliament’s
1689 similar provision, which Parliament had
demanded of the newly crowned King William.
Members of Parliament sought and obtained
this protection to promote free and open
debate, by precluding their prosecution by the
Crown for seditious libel or criminal libel, as
well as precluding their being sued civilly for
defamation for words spoken in debate.

Delegate Brown stated that:
“[h]e could not prove before a jury that bribery and
corruption had of late prevailed in our legislative bodies, but
the charge had been made not only by the people, but by the
press, and with such proofs that he believed it.”
He argued that:
“The question is simply shall the ancient honor of the State of
Maryland be kept untarnished, or not? Shall the integrity of
our republican institutions be kept pure, or not?”

It shall be the duty of the General Assembly, at its first session, held after the

adoption of this Constitution to provide by Law for the punishment, by fine, or
imprisonment in the Penitentiary, or both…, of any person, who shall bribe, or attempt to
bribe, any Executive, or Judicial officer of the State of Maryland, or any member, or officer
of the General Assembly of the State of Maryland, or of any Municipal corporation in the
State of Maryland, … in order to influence him in the performance of any of

his official duties; and also, to provide by Law for the punishment, by

fine, or imprisonment in the Penitentiary, or both,… of any of said
[Executive or Judicial] officers, or members [or officers of the General
Assembly, or of a municipal corporation ], who shall demand, or
receive any bribe, fee, reward, or testimonial, for the performance of
his official duties, or for neglecting, or failing to perform the same….
[The next session the General Assembly passed the statute now
codified as Crim. L. § 9-201 .]

The intent behind Article III,§ 50
seems to have been to create a
“bribery exception” to the
legislative privilege.

Reasons for Privilege and Immunity
Are Not to Protect Bribery
J. Wilner:
This „legislative privilege‟ exists – for both State and City or County
legislators – to provide “immunity when acting in the sphere of
LEGITIMATE LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY.”
“Illegal acts such as BRIBERY are obviously NOT in aid of legislative
activity and legislators can claim no immunity for illegal acts.”
Montgomery County v. Schooley, 97 Md. App. 107 (1993) (quoting Bruce v.
Ridley, 631 F.2d 272 (4th Cir. 1980) with approval ). Accord U.S. v. Brewster, 408
U.S. 501 (1972).

At its next session after the 1867
Constitutional Convention, the General
Assembly passed the statute now
codified as § 9-201 of the Criminal Law
article (formerly Art. 27, §22), making
legislators and other public officials
criminally liable for bribery.
§ 9-201(which is reproduced in full in SB
285) tracks the language of Md. Const.,

art. III, §50.

“A civil or criminal action may not be brought against a
city or town councilman, county commissioner, county
councilman, or similar official by whatever name known,
for words spoken at a meeting of the council or board
of commissioners or at a meeting of a committee or
subcommittee thereof.”
S.B. 285 amends this statute, so as to create an explicit
exception for prosecutions under Crim. L. §9-201.

1997: Md. Code Ann., Cts & Jud. Proc. § 5-526 was
added, to further protect legitimate acts by
legislators:

“(a) A member of a state legislature, including a
member of the General Assembly of Maryland,
who makes a communication on behalf of a
constituent is not civilly liable for defamation

unless the communication is false and made with
knowledge of or in reckless disregard of its
falsity.

(b) This section does not supersede or constitute a
waiver of a member’s constitutional, statutory, or
common law privileges or immunities.”

Most of the reported cases under Crim. L. §9-201
have involved bribes or kickbacks to executive
agency officers for the awarding of contracts.

Background:

Baltimore City Councilwoman Helen B. Holton was
Chair of the Economic Development and Public
Financing Subcommittee until January 2007, and Chair
of the Taxation and Finance Committee as of January
2007.
She was indicted for allegedly having accepted a
developer’s $12,500 payment for a political survey on
her behalf, in exchange for her deciding vote in
granting a tax break to Ron Lipscomb’s Inner Harbor
East development project.

The State Prosecutor argued that the legislative privilege did not
apply to local legislators charged with state crimes.
The court held that it did apply.
The court construed the Maryland statutory legislative privilege
for local legislators (Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-501) as having the
same scope as the legislative privilege for General Assembly
members, found in MD Const., art. III, § 18.
The court construed the MD law the same way the US Supreme
Court has construed the federal constitutional legislative
privilege protecting members of Congress: the legislator may be
prosecuted for bribery, but no evidence of her legislative acts
may be admitted.

Five members of the Court of Appeals held that the
indictment must be dismissed due to legislative privilege,
because the indictment relied upon evidence of Ms.
Holton’s legislative acts.
The bribery case never went to trial.
Without the evidence of Councilwoman Holton’s legislative
acts, all that could be proved was acceptance of a
contribution in excess of the $4000 limit (to which she
ultimately pled nolo contendere).

She was reelected to the City Council.

The Holton decision to bar evidence of
legislative acts in state prosecutions for
bribery thwarts the intent underlying MD
Const., art. III, § 50 and Crim. L. § 9-201.
The federal constitution has no corollary to
MD Const., art. III, sec. 50.
The Court of Appeals neither cited nor
discussed MD Const., art. III, sec. 50.

Because it relied on evidence of Mayor Dixon’s legislative
acts when she was on the City Council, Sheila Dixon’s
bribery indictment was also dismissed. She went to trial
on other charges and was convicted of misdemeanor
embezzlement for her personal use of the Holly Trolley
gift cards.

She subsequently entered an Alford plea to perjury
regarding her failure to disclose gifts from developer
Ron Lipscomb and received a PBJ for her sentence as to
both crimes.
Under the terms of her plea bargain, she receives an
$83,000 a year pension from Baltimore City taxpayers,
and she will be able to run again for public office after
her 4 years’ probation is over.

SB 284 & 285 amend MD Const. art. III, § 18 and Cts. &
Jud. Proc. § 5-501 to make the “bribery exception” to the
legislative privilege explicit in STATE prosecutions of state
or local legislators for bribery, just as such evidence is
already admissible in trials of state or local legislators for
similar federal crimes.*
These bills are intended to make it clear that evidence of
legislative acts is admissible in bribery prosecutions in
state courts, as well.

* When state or local legislators are on trial for federal crimes, the
federal criminal law supersedes state law, and no state privilege or
immunity is recognized.

Editorials urging the General Assembly to take
decisive action against unethical practices seem
to reflect widespread public sentiment.
Passing SB 284 & 285 will show our citizens that
the General Assembly does not tolerate bribery.
SB 284 will put the explicit Constitutional
“bribery exception” on the ballot in the next
general election, so that the voters will see it.

